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To have an impact on national poverty, attempts to redistribute
resources from richer to poorer states or sectors must be supple-
mented by interventions to reach the poor within regions or
sectors-to  reduce the costs borne by the poor in donor regions
and enhance benefits to the poor in recipient regions.
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How much can India reduce poverty nationwide  Datt and Ravallion's simulations suggest
by manipulating the distribution of income be-  that the quantitative potential for alleviating
tween regions or sectors?  national poverty through purely regional redis-
tribulive policies is small.  Even assuming no
What is the overall effect on the poor of tar-  political problems, the maximum impact on
geting resources toward the poorer states of  poverty is no more than  ould be achieved
India - or toward the generally poorer rural  simply by giving everyone a uniform (un-
sector?  targeted) windfall gain equal to about 1.5
percent of India's mean consumption. And
The answer to these questions is far from  other considerations - including increased
obvious, report Datt and Ravallion.  Given real  migration to areas of higher benefits - make it
constraints on policy changes, it can be argued  unlikely that the maximum impact will be
that the costs (to donor regions) and the benefits  attained in practice.
(to recipient regions) of regional policies will
tend to be bome widely within regions.  Greater alleviation of poverty requires
supplementary interventions that reach the poor
Some benefits are likely to leak to the  within regions, by reducing the costs borne by
nonpoor in recipient regions, and some costs to  the poor in donor regions and enhancing benefits
the poor in donor regions. And with benefits  to the poor in recipient regions.
targeted to the agricultural sector, the costs to
the urban poor may be higher than the benefits
to the rural poor can justify.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and External
Affairs Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly. even if presentations are less than fully
polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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The  extent  of India's  regional  and  sectoral  disparities  has been
an issue  since  at least  Independence,  and  this  concern  has  been  partly
motivated  by a desire  to  alleviate  poverty. 1 For  example,  India's  Finance
Commissions  (including  the  most recent  Ninth  Finance  Commission)  have  used
a 'poverty  criterion"  for  disbursements  of public  revenues  to the  states. 2
The  World  Bank  has  also  recently  advocated  changes  in  the  center's  revenue
sharing  arrangements  so as to target  resources  toward  poorer  states  of
India  in the  context  of an  overall  poverty  alleviation  strategy. Advocates
of  policy  reforms  favoring  the  agricultural  sector  have  also  pointed  to  the
fact  that  levels  of poverty  are  generally  higher  in rural  areas.
The  targeting  of development  resources  toward  poorer  regions  or
sectors  in  preference  to richer  ones  has seemed  an attractive  policy  option
in India,  as  elsewhere. Partly  this  reflects  the  informational  constraints
facing  policy  makers  in developing  countries  when attempting  to identify
and  reach  the  poor, 3 but  it  clearly  also  reflects  political  constraints
inhibiting  redistributive  possibilities  within  regions  or sectors  of an
economy. Given  these  constraints,  the  question  remains: Just  how  much
impact  on augregate  poverty  is  possible  by  manipulating  the  distribution  of
income  between  regions  or sectors?
The  answer  is far  from  obvious. It can  be argued  that,  given
real  constraints  on policy  changes,  the  costs (to  donor  regions)  and
benefits  (to  recipient  regions)  of regional  policies  will tend  to  borne
widely  within  regions. Some  leakage  of  benefits  to the  non-poor  in
recipient  regions,  and  of costs  to  the  poor  in  donor  regions,  is  probably
unavoidable.  Clearly,  the  existing  constraints  or.  redistributive-2-
possibilities  in  most  developing  countries  will  diminish  the  poverty
alleviation  impact of direct  policy  intervention.  However,  not  even  the
qualitative  effect  of regional/sectoral  policies  is  clear. Take  for
example,  the  poverty  alleviation  case  for  policy  reforms  aimed  at giving  a
"pro-rural"  emphasis  in sectoral  policies. Granted  the  rural  population  is
(as  a rule)  poorer  on average. But  it  may also  be the  case  that  the  inter-
sectoral  redistributions  associated  with the  policy  reform  carry  a heavier
burden  on the  urban  poor,  than  the  concomittant  gains  to the  rural  poor  can
justify. When  we are  unable  to  avoid  the  urban  poor  bearing  costs  of
policy  reform,  and  are  unable  to  effectively  target  the  benefits  to the
rural  poor,  we may  well find  that  eliminating  the "urban  bias"  in past
sectoral  priorities  actually  increases  aggregate  poverty.
Our  aim  in this  paper  is to  explore  the  implications  of regional
and  sectoral  disparities  for  national  poverty,  and  the  case  for  inter-
regional  redistributive  policies. We address  the  follcwing  questions:
(i)  How  much  do regional  disparities  in  average  living  standards
contribute  to  aggregate  poverty  in India?
(ii) Under  what conditions  can  aggregate  poverty  be reduced  by
transfers  aimed  at reducing  disparities  in average  living
standards  between  regions  or sectors?
(iii) Are those  conditions  plausible  for  India  and,  if  so,  how  much
impact  on  poverty  in India  can  be  expected  from  this  type  of
policy  intervention?
The  paper's  objectives  are  modest  in several  ways,  and  some
caveats  are  called  for  concerning  the  policy  implications  of our  analysis.
First,  we will be  concerned  only  with  what  may  be called  the  direct  or
first-round  effects  of regional  redistribution.  Thus,  for  instance,  we do-3-
not  consider  possible  effects  through  the  location  decisions  of  households,
Migration  responses  arn  likely  to reduce  the  povertv  alleviation  impact,
assuming  that  it is the  non-poor  who  are  in the  best  position  to  evade
regional  redistribution  by migration. Similarly,  our  analysis  does  not
consider  general  equilibrium  effects  on incomes  and  prices  within  regions. 4
It is  unclear  in  what direction  this  would  affect  our  results.
Second,  we will ignore  some  of the  constraints  on the  regional
policy  problem  which  may  become  binding  in  practice. Probably  most
importantly,  we do  not  consider  "political-economy  constraints"  on the
centre's  redistributive  powers  across  regions. For  example,  it  may  be
politically  unfeasible  to levy  taxes  on certain  regions  beyond  some  point.
Such  constraints  will reduce  the  maximum  poverty  alleviation  impact  of
regional  redistributions  when  compared  to  the  attainable  outcome  without
those  constraints,  thus  leading  us to  err  on the  side  of overestimating  the
poverty  alleviation  potential  of regional  redistribution.  The  omission  of
political-economy  constraints  is  probably  less  worrying  when discussing
small  redistributive  reforms  (when  the  constraints  may rarely  be binding)
than  it is  when examining  optimal  allocations  which  may involve  large
transfers.
The  following  section  examines  the  above  questions  in  the
abstract. It describes  how  the  contribution  of regional  disparities  in
average  living  standards  to  aggregate  poverty  can  be quantified.  It  also
considers  the  effects  of  certain  stylized  redistributions  from  "rich"  to
"poor"  regions  or sectots  on aggregate  poverty. We discuss  how  the  poverty
alleviation  case  for  regional  redistributive  policies  depends  on intra-
regional  distributions  and  how they  are  affected  by inter-regional
transfers.-4-
The paper's empirical results are presented in Sections  3 and 4.
Section  4 discusses  our  data  from  India's  38th  Round  National  Sample  Survey
(1983)  and  what it shows  about  regional  disparities,  and  the  regional
profiles  of poverty. Section  4 then  presents  our simulations  of the
effects  on aggregate  poverty  of existing  regional  disparities,  and  the
effects  of regional  redistribution  in  India,  drawing  on the  theoretical
results  of Section  2.  The final  section  summarizes  our  conslusions.
2.  Regional  Disparities  and  National  Poverty
This section presents  the theoretical results  that we  will need  to
answer  the  three  questions  posed  in  the  Introduction.  We first  consider
the  contribution  of regional  disparities  to  aggregate  poverty,  and  how that
may  be  measured. We then  ask  the  comparative  static  question: will small
reductions  in those  disparities  while  preserving  the  national  mean decrease
aggregate  poverty? Finally,  we will  consider  the  question  of how  much
impact  on poverty  can  be expected  from  reducing  or eliminating  regional
disparities.
The  national  poverty  level  can  be thought  of as a function  of
three  factors: regional  disparities  in  average  living  standards,  intra-
regional  inequalities,  and  the  national  mean living  standard. The
contribution  of regional  disparities  alone  can  be quantified  by estimating
the  aggregate  poverty  level  that  what  would  o,cain  if  mean income  levels
were fully  equalized  across  regions  while  holding  the  other  two  factors
constant,  i.e.,  maintaining  the  same  overall  national  mean and  the  intra-
regional  distributions.  We shall  term  this "the  partial  contribution  of-5-
regional  disparities",  so as  to emphasize  the  fact  that  the  other  relevant
factors  mentioned  above  are  being  held  constant.
There  are  a  number  of reasons  to  be cautious  in  drawing  policy
implications  from  such  an experiment.  For  example,  an  enforced
equalization  of tagional  mians  may  well entail  some  sacrifice  in  the
national  mean (to  the  extent  that  resources  are  constrained  from  flowing  to
regions  of  higher  productivity).  Nor  is the  equalization  of regional  means
holding  intra-regional  inequalities  constant  likely  to  be informationally
feasible  from  the  point  of view  of the  central  government;  to implement  the
multiplicative  transfers  needed  for  pure  regional  redistribution  tne
government  would  need  to  know  each  person's  income. That  is  very  unlikely.
However,  quantification  of the  partial  contribution  of regional  disparities
to  national  poverty  is at least  the  obvious  first  step  in  quantifying  their
total  contribution  under  more  realistic  assumptions  about  the  induced
effects  on  other  determinants  of aggregate  poverty. Later  we shall
consider  the  effects  of small  regional  redistributions  under  somewhat  more
realistic  assumptions.
Writing  poverty  in region  j as a ftnction  of tLe  mean  income  and
the  parameters  of the  Lorenz  curve  for  region  j (denoted  by #j and  the
vector  Lj respectively),  the  existing  aggregate  poverty  is:
m
P  E  w.P(/sj,Lj)
where  wi  is the  share  of region  j in the  total  population  of  m regions.
(We  follow  recent  literature  in  assuming  a class  of additively  separable,
population  weighted,  poverty  measures. Specific  examples  are  discussed
later'. If  all  regional  means  were to  be equalized,  while  retaining  the-6-
same  national  mean and  intra-regional  distributions,  then  aggregate  poverty
would  be obtained  as
*  m





The  contribution  of interregional  disparities  in  average  living  standards
to  aggregate  poverty  is  then  given  by (P-P*)/P. This  is  estimated  for
India  in  section  4.
Rather  than  equalizing  regional  means,  consider  instead  the  effect
of small  reductions  in regional  disparities  on  aggregate  poverty.  Again
this  will  depend  in  part  on how  inter-regional  redistribution  alters  intra-
regional  inequalities.  That  will depend  on the  way in  which  the
redistribution  is implemented.  For  example,  lump-sum  transfers  to  or from
all  residents  of  each region  would  reduce  inequality  in recipient  regions,
and  raise  it in  donor  regions. But  the  aggregate  outcome  for  the  poor
remains  unclear  even  if  one  considers  a "pure"  form  of regional
redistribution  based  on multiplicatively  absorbed  transfers  which  do  not
alter  relative  inequalities  within  regions. Poverty  will decrease  in
recipient  regions,  and  increase  in  donor  regions. The  aggregate  outcome
will then  depend  on  whether  the  incremental  gain  to  the  poor in  the
recipient  region  exceeds  the  loss  for  those  in the  donor  region;  this  will
depend  on  both  the  regional  disparities  in  average  standards  of living  and
on  any  disparities  in intra-regional  inequalities.  We shall  make  these
observations  more  precise  in  this  section,  so as to  allow  an analytically-7-
tractable  characterization  of the  conditions  under  which  regional
disparities  can  be said  to  contribute  to  aggregate  poverty.
Consider  the  situation  in  which  the  reduction  in regional
disparities  takes  the  form  of lump-sum  transfers,  which  are  uniformly
levied  on,  or received  by,  all  persons  in a given  region. This is  termed
"additive  absorption."  Thus,  the  transfer  paid  or received  by an
individual  is solely  determined  by his/her  region  of residence.  An
attraction  of this  case  is  that  it does  not  assume  that  the  government
knows  anything  more than  each  person's  region  of residence  and  is,  thus,
informationally  feasible  from  the  point  of  view  of the  central  government.
However,  it  may  be argued  that  multiplicative  transfers  are  more  feasible
politically,  at local  level,  insofar  as they  do  not involve  any  change  in
intra-regional  inequalities.  It  may  also  be argued  that  the  same  local
political-economy  factors  (endowment  distributions,  local  tax  powers,  the
social  preferences  of governments,  etc.),  which  determined  initial  intra-
regional  distributions  will  operate  persistently  to  preserve  those
distributions.  Thus  there  are  good  arguments  for  considering  both  additive
and  multiplicative  absorption.
The  outcome  will also  depend  on  how  poverty  is  measured. We shall
consider  various  members  of the  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  (FGT)  class  of
measures. The  level  of poverty  in  the  ith  region  is  denoted  Pai  for  the
parameter  a  2 0.  The  well-kncwn  headcount  index  of  poverty  (proportion  of
people  who are  poor)  is  the  FGT  measure  for  a=O.  For  a=1  we ootain  the  FGT
version  of the  poverty  gap  measure  (mean  income  shortfall  as a  proportion
of the  poverty  line),  and  a recently  popular  distributionally  sensitive
measure  of poverty  is  obtained  by setting  a=2.  The  l,tter  is  our  preferred
measure,  as it satisfies  Sen's  (1976)  Transfer  Axiom (in  that  transfersfrom  a poor  person  to someone  who is  poorer  will docrease  measured
poverty). An advantage  of the  FGT  class  of  measures  in this  context  is
that  they  are  additively  separable.  so  that  national  poverty  is simply  the
population  weighted  mean  of the  regional  poverty  levels. (This  does  not
hold  for  Sen's  own index).
The  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  determining  the
poverty  effect  of additively  absorbed  lump-sum  transfers  between  regions
can  be summarized  as follows: 5
Proposition  1 (Additive  Absorption): The  aggregate  headcount
index  (a-0)  will  decrease  when  a  small  additively  absorbed
transfer  is  made from  region  j  to  region  k if  and  only  if  fj(z)  <
fk(z)  where  fi(z)  denotes  the  probability  density  function  of
income  in region  i-j,k  as evaluated  at the  poverty  line  a.  For
other  measures  in the  FGT  class  (a  2 1),  poverty  will decrease  if
and  only  if  Pa.ij  <  Pa-1k.
Figures  1  and  2 illustrate  how the  national  headcount  index  of
poverty  is affected  by additively  absorbed  redistribution  between
hypothetical  "urban"  and 'rural"  sectors  which  we assume  (for  convenience)
to  be of equal  size. Each  person  in  the  rural  sector  receives  an  amount  x,
which is  transferred  from  each  person  in the  urban  sector. Distribution
functions are thus displaced horircitally (to  the right for rural areas, to
the  left  for  urban),  and  by an  ,ual  horizontal  distance  at all  points.
But rather  than  draw  this  explicitly,  we can  imagine  shifting  the  poverty
line;  for  example,  if  a proportion  F(z)  of the  rural  population  were  poor
initially,  then  this  will fall  to  F(z-x)  when  each  person  receives  x.  InFigure 1: Effects  on aggregate  poverty  of  urban-rural  redistributlon
(Poverty  line less  than mode)
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Figure 2!  Effects  on aggregate poverty  of urban-rural  redistribution
(Poverty  line greater  than modJe)
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Figure  1 the  income  distribution  functions  are  drawn  convex  from  below,
implying  that (for  the  usual  unimodal  density)  the  mode is  above  the
poverty  line.  Two  possible  "urban"  distributions  are  considered,
generating  the  same  initial  poverty  level,  but  different  final  levels. The
"urban  1"  distribution  is 'flatter"  at  the  poverty  line  (implying  a lower
density)  and so  we find  that  the  aggregate  headcount  index  falls  as a
result  of the  redistribution  in favor  of the  rural  sector,  as claimed  in
Proposition  1.  Another  way of interpreting  this  result  is  by  noting  that
the "urban  1" distribution  has a similar  Lorenz  curve  to the  rural
distribution  (as  evident  from  the  fact  it is  drawn  as  a roughly
proportional  horizontal,  displacement  of the  rural  distribution).  And so,
given  that  convexity  holds,  the  transfer  from  urban  to rural  sectors
decreases  aggregate  poverty. By contrast,  the "urban  2" distribution  is
considerably  more inequitable  than  the  rural  distribution,  with the
consequence  that  redistribution  in  favor  of  the  latter  sector  now increases
aggregate  poverty;  this  follows  from  the  fact  that  the "urban  2"
distribution  is  more  dense  (has  "steeper"  slope)  than  the  rural
distribution  at the  poverty  line.  Figure  2 illustrates  how  the  same
outcome  is achieved  if  the  poverty  line  is in  a concave  segment  of the
distribution  (the  poverty  line  is  above  the  mode)  and  relative  inequalities
are similar  within  sectors;  in this  case,  transfers  from  the  urban  to the
poorer  rural  sector  increase  aggregate  poverty.
To illustrate  the  importance  of the  precise  way in  which  regional
rediatribution  is implemented,  consider  instead  a Rpure"  regional
redistribution  such  that  transfers  leave  intra-regional  inequalities
unaffected;  specifically,  the  Lorenz  curve  of each  region's  income
distribution  is assumed  to remain  unaffected  by the  transfers. In this- 10  -
case,  all  transfers  paid  or received  are  directly  proportional  to  household
income  per  capita  and  the  proportion  transfered  varies  solely  by region.
Analogously  to Proposition  1,  we can  summarize  the  necessary  and sufficient
conditions  for  such  multiplicative  regional  transfers  to alleviate
aggregate  poverty  as follows:
ProDosition  2 (Multiplicative  Asbortpion)s Small  redistributions
from  j to  k while  preserving  intra-regional  inequalities  will
reduce  the  aggregate  headcount  index  of poverty  if  and  only  if
fj(z)Ipj  C  fk(z)IIk  where  pi denotes  mean income  in region  ij,k.
For  other  poverty  measures  (e2l),  the  necessary  and  sufficient
condition is  that (Pg.lj  - Paj)/pj c (Pa-lk  - Pak)Ipk-
Notice  that  when  the  donor  has  the  higher  mean,  and  a less  dense
distribution  at the  poverty  line,  the  aggregate  headcount  index  will fall.
Thus,  for  example,  redistribution  from  the "urban  1" sector  to the  rural
sector  in  Figure  1  would  still  reduce  aggregate  poverty. It is,  however,
no longer  clear  that  the  opposite  is true  for  the  "urban  2" sector,  or for
the  redistribution  from  urban  to rural  sectors  in  Figure  2; if  the
disparity  in  means  is  high  enough  (more  precisely  we require  that  #j/#k  >
fj/fk)  then  poverty  will  be alleviated.
Another  way to  understand  this  result  is  by  noting  that  the
headcount  index  is  strictly  convex  in  the  mean,  holding  the  Lorenz  curve
constant. This  is proved  in  the  Appendix  where  it is  also shown  to  be true
of the  FGT  measures  for  a=l  and  2.  Thus,  aggregate  poverty  is  a strictly
quasi-convex  function  of  the  vector  of regional  means,  though  that  function
is  only symmetric  if  Lorenz  curves  are  everywhere  the  same. By  well  knownproperties  of such  functions,  a reduction  in regional  disparities  will
reduce  aggregate  poverty  if those  disparities  are  initially  large  enough.
Equalization  will  not,  however,  be optimal  as a rule,  and  so there  can
still  be transfers  from  "rich"  to "poor"  regions  which  increase  aggregate
noverty.
The  above  discussion  has  focused  on the  theoretical  case  for
redistributing  incomes  across  regions  when that  case is  to  be judged  by the
direction  of the  effects  on  aggregate  poverty. It is  of interest  to
quantify  optimal  regional  targeting  from  this  point  of  view.  Of course,
the  sense  in  which  poverty  minimizing  regional  allocations  are "optimal"  is
quite  restrictive;  poverty  alleviation  is  unlikely  to  be the  sole  criterion
for  judging  such  policies. But  we are  still  interested  in  the  poverty
minimizing  allocation,  because  this  is the  appropriate  benchmark  for
e'aluating  the  potential  for  regional  redistribution,  in  that  it allows  us
to  estimate  the  maximum  impact  that  this  type  of policy  could  have  on
poverty. Trade-offs  against  other  policy  objectives  will  diminish  our
desire  to  attain  that  maximum,  but  we are  still  interested  in its  value.
For  example,  given  the  fact  that  regional  redistribution  is  a form  of
targeting  under  imperfect  information,  and  that  region  of residence  may  be
a  highly  imperfect  poverty  indicator,  one  may find  that  the  potential  for
poverty  alleviation  by this  means  is  modest. That  can  only  be determined
with precision  by calculating  the  optimal  (poverty  minimizing)  allocation.
Drawing  on recent  work  one  can  readily  characterize  and  calculate
the  optimal  allocation  of  uniform  lump-sum  transfers  for  the  P2 poverty
measure. 6 The  necessary  condition  for  a  minimum  of the  aggregate  value  of
P2 is that  Pli is  equalized  across  all regions,  at given  national  income.
It is  also  useful  to  have  a  monetary  measure  of the  gain  from  optimal- 12 -
regional  redistribution.  For  this  purpose,  the  equivalent  Rain  from
targeting  is  defined  as the  uniform  (untargeted)  lump-sum  gain  needed  to
achieve  the  level  of  poverty  under  optimal  regional  targeting  (Ravallion
and  Chao,  1989).
3.  Average  Consumption  Levels.  Inequality  and  Poverty  in India:
A Regional  Profile
Our  main source  of  data  is the  National  Sample  Survey  (NSS)  38th
round  survey  or,  consumer  expenditure  for  1983 (NSSO,  1986). The  survey
gives  the  size  distribution  of  per  capita  monthly  consumption  expenditures
in  urban  and  rural  areas  of different  states  and  union  territories.  Our
analysis  relates  to 40 regions  in  India,  namely  the  urban  and  rural  sectors
of 20 states  (see  Table  1).  accounting  for  98.4  percent  of India's  total
population  (RGCCI,  1982).7 Many of the  following  calculations  were also
performed  on the  data  for  the  20 states,  not  split  into  urban  and  rural
sectors. The  poverty  reduction  attainable  through  regional  redistribution
will generally  increase  with finer  regional  detail.
One important  limitation  of these  data (in  common  with  most  other
surveys)  is that  they  only  provide  single  cross-sections.  Our  analysis
will thus  be static. We do  not  consider  possible  effects  of combining
spatial  and  temporal  redistributions;  for  example,  transfers  from  the  urban
sector  to the  rural  sector  during  lean  seasons  or poor  crop  years  can  be
expected  to  have  a greater  impact  on aggregate  poverty  than  at  other
times.8- 13 -
Price  Deflators
The  NSS  data  on consumption  expenditures  are,  of course,  in
current  local  prices. In  order  to  make inter-regional  comparisons  and
evaluate  aggregate  poverty,  it is thus  necessary  to adjust  the  nominal  data
for  spatial  variations  in the  cost  of living. We use  the  following  two
price  indices  to  express  all  regional  expenditures  in  1983  all-India  ruzal
prices:
i)  The rural  price  index  (RPI)  for  state  j is defined
CPIAL  (1983)  CPIALAI(973-74)
PI  RPR;  CPIAL  (1973-74)  CPIALAI(1983)
where  RPRs  are  the  rural  interstate  price  relatives  (ratio  of rural  prices
in state  J to all-India  rural  prices)  for  1973-74  and  are  based  on the
Fither  regional  price  indices  constructed  by  Bhattacharya  et al (1980,
Table  3a). 9 CPIALs  are  the  Consumer  Price  Indices  for  Agricultural
Labourers,  as tabulated  by the  Labour  Bureau,  Ministry  of  Labour. It  can
be seen  that  the  proposed  price  index  simply  updates  the  rural  interstate
price  relatives  for  1973-74  to 1983  ubing  the  CPIAL  as the  rural  price
deflator.
ii)  The  urban  price  index  (UPI)  for  state  j  is  defined  analogously  as
CPIIW.(1983)  CPIAL  AI(1973-74)
UPIt  URPR  T  UPR7  A J*  CPIIW.(1973-74)'  CPIAL  AI(1 983)
where  UPRs  are  the  urban  interstate  price  relatives  (analogous  to  RPRs)  and
URPR is the  all-India  urban-to-rural  price  relative  for  1973-74. Both  UPRs- 14 -
and  URPR  are  derived  from  Bhattacharya  et  al (Tables  3b,4). CPIlWs  are  the
Consumer  Price  Indices  for  Industrial  Workers  (Labour  Bureau,  Ministry  of
Labour);  CPIIWs  are  constructed  as state-specific  simple  averages  over
centers  in  each  state  and  over  months  during  the  relevant  period. 10
The  above  two  price  indices  are  used  to transform  1983  local-price
values  into  1983  all-India  rural  prices.
Mean Consumption  Levels  and  Regional  Inequality
Table  1 summarizes  the  relevant  data.  The  following  observations
can  be  made:
i)  The  national  mean  consumption  expenditure  for  1983  is  about
Rs.116  per  capita  per  month  at 1983  all-India  rural  prices. At the  state
level,  average  consumption  ranges  from  the  lowest,  Rs.90,  in  Bihar  to the
highest,  Rs.163,  in  Punjab. Intra-regional  inequality,  as  measured  by the
Gini  coefficient,  is low  to  moderate  for  most regions,  ranging  from  about
0.18  in  urban  Manipur  to  about  0.36  in  urban  Tamil  Nadu.
ii) Mean per  capita  consumption  levels  in  urban  areas  are
generally  higher  than  those  in  rural  areas,  even  after  allowing  for
sectoral  differences  in  the  cost  of living. At the  all-India  level,  the
difference  is  about  11  percent  of the  rural  mean  consumption.  However,
inter-regional  variation  in  mean consumption  levels  is greater  amongst  the
rural  areas  (of  the  20 states)  than  amongst  the  urban  areas.
iii) The  Gini  coefficient  of per  capita  household  consumption  is
generally  higher  in  urban  areas  than  rural  areas,  and it  is significantly
correlated  with the  mean (r-0.37;  t=2.5)  across  the  40 regions.- 15 -
Reaional/Sectoral  Profiles  of Poverty
Tables  2 and  3 gives  the  FGT  poverty  measures  for  a  - 0.1.2  for
each  sector  and  state. The  Appendix  outlines  how  these  poverty  measures
are  calculated  from  the  published  grouped  data.  The  measures  are  evaluated
at two  poverty  lines,  namely  monthly  per  capita  expenditures  of Rs 76.65
(Table  2) and  Rs 89.00 (Table  3)  at 1983  all-India  rural  prices. The lower
of the  two  poverty  lines  corresponds  to the  widely  used  Dandekar-Rath
poverty  line  of Rs 15  per  capita  at  1960-61  all-India  rural  prices  updated
by the  all-India  CPIAL  for  1983. The  higher  poverty  line  is  obtained  by
updating  the  Sixth  Plan  poverty  line  of  Rs 49.09  at 1973-74  rural  prices  by
the  consumer  price  index  for  middle  rural  population,  developed  by Minhas
et al., (1987).
The  motivation  for  using  two  poverty  lines  is  not  to compare  the
relative  merits  of alternative  poverty  lines  or consumer  price  indices,  but
simply  to  examine  whether  the  conclusions  of our  analysis  are  sensitive  to
the  exact  cut-off  point  used  to define  poverty. Our  range  of poverty  lines
appears  to safely  encompass  the  range  of opinion  on  this  issue. 11
The  following  observations  can  be  made  on the  results  in  Tables  2
and  3:
i)  About  33  percent  of the  national  population  are  deemed  to  have
been  poor  in 1983  using  the  lower  poverty  line. This  rises  to  about  44
percent  using  the  higher  line. For  the  lower  poverty  line,  the  1983
poverty  gap  per  capita  (P 1) represents  8.1  percent  of the  poverty  line,
equivalent  to  Rs 6.20  per  person  in  India  per  month,  or about  5.4  percent
of India's  mean consumption  per  capita  in that  year. The  poverty  gap  rises- 16 -
to 12.3  percent,  or about  8.1  percent  of  mean  consumption  using  the  higher
poverty  line.
ii)  The  prevalence  of poverty  is  generally  greater  iL rural
areas. The  rural  sector  accounts  for  about  80 percent  of  aggregate  poverty
regardless  of  which  poverty  line  or poverty  measure  is  used.  It  may  be of
interest  to  note that  the  difference  between  urban  and  rural  areas  in P1 is
mainly  due  to the  difference  in PO;  the  average  poverty  gap  of the  rural
poor (obtained  as Pj/P 0) is  only  slightly  higher  than  that  of the  urban
poor (25  and  28 percent  against  24 and  27 percent,  respectively,  for  the
lower  and  higher  poverty  lines).
iii) In terms  of the  preferred  FGT  measure  for  a = 2. the  10
poorest  regions  (in  descending  order)  for  the  lower  poverty  line  are  rural
West  Bengal,  rural  Tamil  Nadu,  rural  Bihar,  rural  Orissa,  rural  Meghalaya,
urban  Tamil  Nadu,  rural  Karnataka,  urban  Bihar,  rural  Maharashtra  and  urban
Maharashtra. The same  ten  regions  also  turn  out  to be the  poorest  using
the  higher  poverty  line  (although  with some  re-ranking). 12 These  ten
regions  account  for  62.5  and  59.1  percent  of aggregate  P2 for  the  lower  and
the  higher  poverty  lines,  respectively;  in  contrast,  their  share  in total
population  is  about  40  percent  and  their  share  in  total  number  of poor  is
52.2  and  49.4  for  the  lower  and  higher  poverty  line,  respectively.
iv)  The  poverty  ranking  of different  regions  is  found  to  be quite
insensitive  to  the  choice  of  the  poverty  measure  or the  poverty  line. The
rank  correlation  coefficients  between  corresponding  poverty  measures  at the
two  poverty  lines  are  0.97,  0.98  and  0.98  for  P0. P1 and  P2, respectively.
For  a given  poverty  line,  the  rank  correlations  are  also  highly  significant
across  the  three  poverty  measures:- 17 -
Rank  Correlation  Coefficient
z - 76.65  z =  89.00
(PO.  P1)  0.96  0.94
(P 1. P2)  0.97  0.97
(PO.  P2)  0.90  0.88
v)  For  all  three  measures,  the  inter-regional  variation  in  poverty
is  greater  than  that  in  mean  consumption  levels  (compare  the  CVs  given  in
the  last  rows  of Tables  1, 2 and  3).  It is  also  notable  (though  not
surprising)  that  regional  disparities  in  poverty  (as  measured  by the
population-weighted  coefficient  of variation)  increase  with  higher  values
of a for  a given  poverty  line. For  any  given  a. however,  regional  poverty
variation  is lower  for  the  higher  poverty  line.
vi)  As one  would  expect,  the  regional  profiles  of  poverty  are
strongly  correlated  with average  consumptions  (negatively)  and  Gini
coefficients  (positively)  across  regions.  An OLS  regression  of the  logit
of the  headcount  index  against  the  means  and  Ginis  from  Table  1 gives  the
following  result  for  the  lower  and  higher  poverty  lines  respectively: 13
log[P 0/(1-PO)]i  =  0.0115  - 0.0303  Meani  +  8.78  Ginii  R2=.953,  n=40
(0.65)  (26.5)  (15.6)
[2.78]  [1.89]
and
log [PO/(l-PO)]i  =  1.05 - 0.0268  Meani +  5.96 Ginii  R2=.960, n=40
(7.61)  (29.8)  (13.5)
(2.10]  [1.09]
for  the  higher  poverty  line. The  corresponding  absolute  elasticities  of P0
with respect  to  both  variables  evaluated  at mean  points  are  given  in
squared  brackets  [  ]  below  the  absolute  t-ratios  ( ).- 18 -
4.  Regional  Disparities  and  Redistribution%  Some  ImDlications  for  Poverty
in India
The  Contribution  of Regional  Disparities  to National  Poverty
Using  the  methodology  outlined  in section  2,  we first  consider  the
contribution  of inter-regional  disparities  in  mean consumption  levels  to
aggregate  poverty  in India. This  is  presented  in  Table  4.  The  results
show  that,  given  the  existing  intra-regional  consumption  distributions,
even removing  all  regional  disparities  in  mean  consumption  per  capita  would
achieve  only  a  modest  reduction  of less  than  two  percentage  points  in the
proportion  of the  population  who are  deemed  to  be poor  either  poverty  line.
The  contribution  of disparities  in regional  means  to the  aggregate  poverty
gap  measure  is somewhat  greater  at  about  an 11  percent  reduction  for  the
lower  poverty  line (about  8 percent  for  the  higher  poverty  line). However,
their  contribution  to aggregatge  P2, the  preferred  FGT  measure  of poverty,
is  virtually  zero  for  either  of the  two  poverty  lines. This  arises  from
the  nature  of underlying  inter-regional  disparities  in intra-regional
inequalities,  such  that  eliminating  regional  disparities  in  means  is sub-
optimal  from  the  point  of  view  of poverty  alleviation.  Complete
equalization  of regional  means  would  have  negligible  effect  on the  severity
of aggregate  poverty  in  India,  as  measured  by P2.
It is important  to remind  ourselves  that  we are  dealing  here  only
with the  direct  or first-round  effects  on  poverty. But,  while  limiting
ourselves  to those  effects,  the  above  results  do suggest  that  the  relative
thrust  of poverty  alleviation  strategies  needs  to be on altering  intra-
regional  distributions  rather  than  on equalizing  regional  means. This- 19  -
statement  needs  to  be interpreted  carefully  though. It  does  not imply  that
inter-regional  transfers  are  an ineffective  instrument  in  a poverty
alleviation  strategy;  rather,  it says  that  for  such  transfers  to  have a
greater  impact  on  poverty,  they  need  to rely  on their  effect  on intra-
regional  distributions  rather  than  their  effect  on regional  disparities  per
se.
To illustrate  this  point,  we consider  another  simulation  exercise
(results  reported  in the  last  two  columns  of  Table  4)  where  existing
regional  means  are  kept  unchanged,  but  intLa-regional  redistributions  are
considered  such  that  the  Gini  coefficient  in  each region  is  allowed  to fall
by 5  percent. In  particular,  per  capita  consumption  of  any  household  h in
any region  j changes  by 5 percent  of the  difference  between  mean
consumption  per  capita  in region  j and  h's  per  capita  consumption.  Such
redistribution,  of  course,  implies  a change  in region  j's  Lorenz  function.
If  the  new  Lorenz  parameter  vector  is  deonoted  LI,  then  aggregate  poverty
P** in  Table  4 is  defined  (using  notation  introduced  in Section  2) as
P  =  £  Qj  j
J=wl  j  i 
It is obvious  from  the  results  in Table  4  that  the  simulated  5
percent  reduction  in regional  Ginis  has  a greater  impact  on  poverty  than
even  a full  equalization  of regional  means. The  difference  is  particularly
striking  for  the  preferred  measured  P2: a 15-20  percent  decline  in  poverty
in  the  former  case  as compared  with  a  mean zero  impact  in the  latter.- 20 -
The  Qualitative  Effect  on National  Poverty  of  Reducing  Regional  Disparities
As we have  seen  in Section  2 there  can  be no theoretical
presumption  that  transfers  from  "rich"  to "poor"  regions  will  reduce  the
proportion  of the  national  population  that  is  poor,  or indeed  any  of the
other  measures  of  poverty. Whether  they  do so  or  not is an  empirical
question  to  which  we now  turn.
We have  tested  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for
desirable  redistributions  between  pairs  of regions  (Propositions  1 and  2)
for  each  of the  780  distinct  binary  combinations  of the  40 regions. '.  t-f
5  summarizes  the  results  for  each  of the  three  poverty  measures  (a=0,  1, 2)
and  for  both  additive  and  multiplicative  absorption  (Propositions  1  and  2
respectively).  The  table  gives  the  number  of cases  in  which  poverty  is
reduced  by a small  transfer  for  which  the  donor  region  has  a  higher  mean
than  the  recipient.  We find  that  at least  74  percent  of all  additive
redistributions  and  at least  81 percent  of all  multiplicative
redistributions  would  reduce  aggregate  poverty.
It also  turns  out  that  poverty-reducing  redistributions  in the
additive  and  multiplicative  cases  considerably  overlap  each  other,  so that
at least  73  percent  of redistributions  are  found  to  be  poverty-reducing  in
both  cases. These  represent  cases  where  the  necessary  and  sufficient
conditions  of Propositions  1  and  2  are simultaneously  satisfied  for  any
given  poverty  measure. In  other  words,  the  results  (in  the  last  6 rows  of
Table  5) show  that  in at least  73  percent  of the  cases,  regional
redistributions  reduce  aggregate  poverty  irrespectively  of  whether  they  are
additively  or  multiplicatively  absorbed  within  regions,  or partially
absorbed  ir  both  ways.- 21 -
We have also  tested  the  effect  of re-distribution  from  urban  to
rural  areas  of each  of the  twenty  states. The  results  are  also  summarized
in  Table  5.  Reducing  urban-rural  disparities  in  mean  consumptions  will
reduce  aggregate  poverty  in  at least  17 out  of the  20 states  in  the
additive  as  well as the  multiplicative  case. In at least  16 of those
states,  urban-to-rural  redistributions  are  poverty-reducing  whether
additively  and/or  multiplicatively  absorbed. The  exceptions  are  mainly
found  in the  states  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  Madhya  Pradesh  and  Manipur.
Though  exceptions  do  occur,  the  overall  qualitative  result  is thus
clear  - redistribution  from  India's  "rich"  states/sectors  to  her "poor"
states/sectors  does  generally  contribute  to aggregate  poverty  alleviation.
The  further  question  is  begging:  how  much  can  poverty  be alleviated  by such
means?
The  Quantitative  Effect  on  National  Poverty  of  Reducing  Regional
Disparities
To give  some  indication  of likely  magnitudes  we shall  consider
additive  absorption  of regional  transfers  aimed  at reducing  aggregate
poverty,  as  measured  by the  FGT  measure  for  a=2.  As discussed  in Section  2
above,  such  transfers  are informationally  feasible. The  poverty  minimizing
transfer  allocation  can  then  be calculated  using  the  method  proposed  by
Ravallion  and  Chao (1989);  note,  again,  that  we are  not  prescribing  such  an
allocation,  rather  it is  a  natural  benchmark  for  measuring  the  potential
for  alleviating  poverty  by reducing  regional  disparities  in  an
informationally  feasible  way.  That  allocation  is  given  in  Table  6 for  both- 22 -
poverty  lines. The  table  also  presents  summary  data  on the  aggregate
effects  of regional  redistribution  on  poverty.
A number  of observations  can  be  made on the  results  of  Table  4:
i)  Out  of the  40 state/sector  combinations,  only  13 are
recipients  under  the  poverty  minimizing  allocation;  in decreasing  order  of
importance  (in  terms  of the  magnitude  of the  optimal  transfer  per  capita)
for  the  lower  poverty  line  the  recipients  are  rural  West Bengal,  rural
Tamil  Nadu,  rural  Bihar,  rural  Orissa,  rural  Meghalaya,  rural  Karnataka,
urban  Tamil  Nadu,  urban  Bihar,  rural  Maharashtra,  urban  Haharashtra,  urban
Uttar  Pradesh,  urban  Karnataka  and  urban  West  Bengal. For  the  higher  line,
there  are  11 recipient  regions,  all  of  which  are  also  recepients  for  the
lower  line;  in decreasing  order  of importance  the  recipients  are  rural  West
Bengal,  rural  Bihar,  rural  Tamil  Nadu,  rural  Orissa,  rural  Maharashtra,
rural  Karnataka,  urban  Bihar,  rural  Meghalaya,  urban  Tamil  Nadu,  urban
'Ittar  Pradesh  and  urban  Maharashtra.
ii)  The  burden  of an optimal  redistribution  would  thus  be spread
over  more than  two-thirds  of the  regions. Nonetheless,  the  burden  reaches
a  fairly  high  proportion  of average  consumption  in  a few  regions,  notably
urban  Meghalaya,  rural  JAmmu  and  Kashmir,  rural  Punjab,  rural  Haryana  and
urban  Himachal  Pradesh. It is  unlikely  that  such  tax  burdens  would  be
politically  implementable.  Imposing  limits  on the  tax  burdens  associated
with regional  redistribution  will further  constrain  the  poverty  alleviation
impact.
iii) Nonetheless,  the  potential  for  alleviating  aggregate  poverty
through  even "unrestricted'  regional  redistribution  seems  quite  modest.
National  poverty  falls  by about  10-14  percent,  though  this  is  difficult  to
interpret  for  the  P2 measure. A more  useful  indicator  is probably  the- 23 -
equivalent  gain  from  targeting;  recall  that  this  is the  increase  in average
consumption  per  capita  which,  if received  in  the  same  amount  by all
regions,  would  achieve  the  same  reduction  in  aggregate  poverty  as that
attainable  through  optimal  redistribution  across  regions. This  is  given  in
the last  row  of Table  6.  We find  that  the  maximum  reduction  in aggregate
poverty  attainable  by regional  redistribution  could  also  be achieved  by
giving  every  person  in  India  an  extra  Rs 1.8-2.0  per  month,  representing  a
little  over  1.5  percent  of  mean  consumption  in  1983.
The  above  results  do  not  offer  much  encouragement  to proponents  of
regional  or sectoral  redistribution  as a  means  of alleviating  poverty  in
India;  in  terms  of the  direct  effects  on  poverty,  the  best  that  could  be
done  by this  means  alone  is  modest. To the  extent  that  the  informational
constraint  can  be relaxed  to allow  a greater  overall  progressivity  of
redistribution,  the  impact  on  poverty  alleviation  would  be greater. But,
against  this  argumer.t.  regional  redistributions  in  practice  will  be further
constrained  by other  economic  and  political  considerations.  The  net
additional  effect  of these  considerations  on poverty  remains  uncertain.
However,  the  above  results  read  in  conjunction  with those  presented  in
Table  4 (and  discussed  earlier  in this  section)  do suggest  that  the
immediate  potential  for  poverty  alleviation  in  India  by  means  of inter-
regional  redistribution  is likely  to  be rather  small,  unless  such
redistribution  also  significantly  alters  the  intra-regional  distributions
in specific  ways.- 24 -
5.  Conclusion
Even  if  we limit  ourselves  to the  direct  effects  of regional
redistribution,  the  impact  on aggregate  poverty  is far  from  obvious.
Whether  or not redistribution  from  regions  with  higher  average  living
standards  to those  with lower  ones,  al eviates  aggregate  poverty  depends  on
the  precise  form  of redistribution,  and  the  nature  of existing  intra-
regional  distributions.  For  example,  if intra-regional  inequalities  cannot
be altered,  the  complete  equalization  of regional  means  is  only  optimal
from  the  point  of  view  of national  poverty  alleviation  if  the  underlying
intra-regional  distributions  are  identical.  More  generally,  regional
variations  in  those  distributions  moderate  (and,  sometimes,  may  even
reverse)  the  case for  regional  equalization.  How  regional  redistribution
affects  national  poverty  is  ultimately  an empirical  question,
Our  empirical  results  for  India  indicate  that  small
redistributions  in  which  the  donor  region  has  a  higher  mean consumption
than  the  recipient  will  generally  (though  not  always)  lead  to a reduction
in  aggregate  poverty. This  holds  for  73  percent  or  more  of the  possible
binary  redistributions  from  "rich"  to "poor"  regions,  defined  as the  urban
or rural  sectors  of each  of 20 states. Redistribution  from  urban  to rural
sectors  will reduce  aggregate  poverty  for  at least  16  of those  states.
However,  our  simulations  also  suggest  that  the  quantitative
potential  for  alleviating  poverty  through  this  type  of policy  intervention
in India  is  quite  modest. For  example,  even  in the  ekcreme  (and  unlikely)
case  of politically  unrestricted,  though  informationally  feasible,
redistribution  across  states  and  urban/rural  sectors  of India  using  lumpsum
transfers,  the  maximum  impact  on poverty  is  no more  than  could  be achieved_ 25 -
by simply  giving  all  persons  a  uniform  (untargeted)  windfall  gain
equivalent  to  about  one  and  a  half  percent  of  India's  mean  consumption
level. In  practice,  it  may  be possible  to relax  the  informational
constraint  somewhat. On the  other  hand,  plausible  political  restrictions
on the  centre's  redistributive  powers  across  states,  and  also  the
behavioral  responses  of  households  (particularly  through  their  migration
possibilitiesi),  are  likely  to allow  even  less  impact  on poverty  from  this
type  of policy. However,  in  either  case,  greater  alleviation  of  poverty
will require  supplementary  interventions  which  reach  the  poor  within
regions,  by reducing  the  costs  borne  by the  poor in  donor  regions,  and/or
by enhancing  benefits  to the  poor  in recipient  regions.
Our results  indicate  that  the  direct  contribution  of inter-
regional  disparities  in average  levels  of living  to aggregate  poverty  in
India  is  negligible  (in  terms  of the  preferred  poverty  measure)  to at best
modest  (in  terms  of the  headcount  index  or the  poverty  gap  measure). Any
adverse  "growth  effects"  of regional  redistribution  on the  national  mean
will further  reduce  the  aggregate  poverty  alleviation  impact.
Redistributive  measures  which  primarily  address  disparities  in regional
mean consumption  levels,  without  any  significant  desirable  effect  on
existing  intra-regional  distributions,  seem  unlikely  to  have  more  than  a
slight  impact  on aggregate  poverty  in  India. The  gains  from  regional
redistribution  as part  of  a poverty  alleviation  strategy  will  depend
heavily  on how intra-regional  inequalities  are  affected.- 26 -
AiDendi:s  Relevant  Analytical  Results
Derivatives  of Poverty  Measures
Here  we summArize  the  analytical  properties  of FGT  poverty
measures  used in  Section  2. Most  of these  properties  are  known  from  recent
work (Kanbur,  1987;  Ravallion  and  Chao,  1989;  Kakwani,  1989;  Thorbecke  and
Berrian,  1989),  though  we shall  elaborate  a little  on results  for  the
headcount  index  and  on second  derivatives  for  all  measures.
Consider  the  FGT  class  of  poverty  measures  whereby  poverty  in the
ith  region  is
z
Pai  8  f(l-ylz) fi(y)dy  a20  (Al)
where  fj(y)  denotes  the  probability  density  of (pre-transfer)  income  y in
region  i, and  z is  the  poverty  line. For  additively  absorbed  transfers,
and  the  headcount  index  of poverty  (a=O),  post-transfer  poverty  in region  i
is simply
Z-Xi
Poi(xi)  =  Ifi(y)dy  (A2)
0
for  which
POi(xi)  =  - fi(Z-xi) <  0  (A3)
and
P 
P 01(x 1) x  fi(z-xi)  (A4)_ 27 -
which  may  be positive  or  negative. Similarly  to (A2),
Z-Zi  z  - y  - x1)a
P i(xi)  - I f(y)dy  for  a  2  0  (A5)
ai i  01  z  ji
and  so
Pai(xi)  'n-  z  Pat  (0<  o  (for  a  2  1)  (A6) Paixi  --  z Pa-ii
P;i(xi)  - a  l  pa-2i  >  0  (for  a  2  2)
fi(z-x  i)Iz  >  0 (for  a  - 1)  (A7)
Consider  instead,  the  multiplicative  case  in  which  the  Lorenz
curve  is  held  constant. Poverty  in  each  region  can  be thought  of as a
function  of that  region's  mean,  pi.  The  marginal  effect  of a change  in the
mean is then  given  by
Paipi  - - zfi(z)  Ipi  <  0  (for  a-O)  (A8)
(Pai  - Pa  li)a/Pi.<  0 (for  a  2 1)
The  second  derivative  is
H  2
Pa  i  QY  - zfi(z)IPi  >  0  (for  a - 0)  (A9)
pji(pi)  =  j(p;i  - p_-li)Pi  - pai  +  Pa_jijaIPi2
(Pai  - 2Pa-li  +  Pa-2i]a(a-l)I/S2  >  0  (for  a  2  1)  (Alo)
noting  that  Pa is itself  a convex  function  of  a.  Notice  also  that  Paijpi)
is strictly  convex  in  pi for  all a.  Thus  aggregate  poverty  £wiPai(ii)
(where  Wi is  the  population  share  of the  ith  region)  is a strictly  quasi-
convex  function  of  the  vector  of  means  (Pl,..qim)  It follows  that  the- 28 -
necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  desirable  regional  redistributions
discussed  in  Section  2 can  also  be used  to characterize  optimal  regional
targeting. It can  be shown  that  a similar  result  holds  for  additively
absorbed  transfers  for  FGT  poverty  measures  with  a  > 1.
Simulations  of Poverty  Measures
Since  (like  most  researchers)  we do  not  have  access  to the  unit
record  data  from  the  NSS, simulation  is required  to  estimate  poverty
measures  from  the  published  grouped  data. Simulated  distributions  are  also
required  for  the  policy  simulations.  For  these  purposes  we have  used
Kakwar.is  (1989)  parameterization  of the  Lorenz  curve:
L(p)  - p - ap7(l-p) 6eE  O ￿  p ￿  1  (All)
which  is the  cumulative  proportion  of total  income  or consumption  held  by
the  poorest  p proportion  of the  population. The  parameters  a, 7 and  6  are
positive,  and  e  is  a random  error. The  parameters  7 and  6  not  exceeding
unity  is sufficient  to  ensure  convexity  of the  Lorenz  curve.  The  Lorenz
parameters  themselves  are  estimated  by OLS  for  each  state/sector  from  the
following  regression:
ln[p-L(p)] - lna +  71np +  61n(l-p)  +  e
All simulations  are  at  EE  - 0. Given  the  mean and  Lorenz  function,  the
distribution  function  is fully  characterized  noting  that  the  slope  of the
generalized  Lorenz  curve,  L'(p)p=x,  is simply  the  inverse  of the
distribution  function  p=F(x). In earlier  work on Indonesian  data,  the- 29 -
Kakwani parameterization  was found to give a better fit than some obvious
alternatives (namely  the original Kakwani-Podder specification and
elliptical Lorenz curves), at least in the crucial lower  half of the
distribution (Ravallion  and Huppi, 1989).
We have then calculated the poverty measures as follows:  Since
L'(PO) =  z/A.  (All) implies that:
1  - aPO7(1-PO) 5 [2  - l  P  i  (A12)
Po  i-P 0
1 1
which is solved numerically for Po (we  used Newton's method).  The poverty
gap measure P1 can be written as
P0
Pl= f  (1- (#/z)L'(p)]dp
0
=  P0 - (#/z)L(P 0)  (A13)
The FGT measure for a =  2 is evaluated as follows.  From the definition of
P2 we know that
p  ~~~~2
P2 = f  [l-(#/z)L'(p)]  dp
0
= (l-0/z)  P0 +  2(C/z)(l-#/z)P 1
p  2  7  +  62 (/z)2  f  a2p27(l_p)[  M  - p(l2p)  (  ]dp
= (l-#lz)  P(lOP)  +(l  2p)
= (1IAI 2p+  2,.jsz)(l-pIz)P 1- 30 -
+  (a#/z)2(7  B(POO27-1,26+1)  - 276B(PO,27,26)
+  62B(PO,27+l126-1)]  (A14)
k  rn-i  n-1
where  B(k,m,n)  - pI  (l-p)  dp.  (Several  software  packages  allow  one  to
0
evaluate  this  using  incomplete  beta functions.)  Thus,  given (j,  a,  7,  6)
for  any  region,  the  FGT  poverty  measures  for  any  poverty  line  are
calculated  from  (A12),  (A13)  and (A14). The  probability  densities  at the
poverty  line  (as  required  by Propositions  1 and  2 and  for  calculating  70)
are  readily  estimated  using  the  fact  that  f(z)  - l/(L"(Po)).- 31 -
NOTES
1.  For  recent  discussions  see  Mishra  (1985),  Bhattacharya  et al (1987),
Sun-rum  (1987),  Dev (1988),  Jain  et al. (1988),  Sundaram  and  Tendulkar
(1988),  and  Prasad  (1988). On sectoral  policies  and  their
implications  for  the  poor  see  Lipton  (1977).
2.  See  GOI (1988). The  specific  formula  used  by the  Finance  Commission
is  somewhat  contentious;  see,  for  example,  Arun (1989).
3.  This  has been  a theme  of recent  analytical  work or.  poverty  alleviation
policies;  for  further  discussion  and  empirical  examples  see  Kanbur
(1987),  Besley  and  Kanbur  (1988),  Ravallion  and  Chao (1989),  Ravallion
(1989a,b)  and  Glewwe  (1989). Ravallion  (1989b)  has  examined  the
potential  for  poverty  alleviation  through  regional  targeting  in
Indonesia,  recognizing  explicitly  that  the  policy  maker  is constrained
by (often  highly)  imperfect  information  on individual  incomes.
4.  Ravallion  (1989b)  discusses  how  the  present  methodology  can  be  adapted
to incorporate  effects  on  pre-transfer  incomes,  though  empirical
implementation  looks  difficult. The  possibilities  for  adverse  genera'l
equilibrium  effects  on incomes  of the  rural  poor  arising  from  attempts
to redistribute  incomes  from  the  urban  to  the  rural  sector  are
discussed  in Ravallion  (1984). For  an interesting  approach  to this
problem  using  social  accounting  matrices  see  Thorbecke  and  Berrian
(1989).
5.  The  results  for  a  2 1  used  in Propositions  1  and  2 can  be found  in
recent  literature,  particularly  following  Kanbur  (1987). The  appendix
summarizes  relevant  analytical  results  from  which  these  propositions
can  be readily  proved,  including  the  properties  claimed  here for  a=0.
6.  The  approach  follows  Ravallion  and  Chao (1989). Also see  Ravallion
(1989b)  for  further  discussion..
7.  Sub-state  level  date  beyond  the  urban/rural  split  is  not available
(the  most recent  available  sub-state  level  distributional  data  from
the  NSS appears  to be 1973-74). But  state  level  analysis  is  probably
of greater  interest  in  this  context,  since  state  level  disbursements
are  the  centre's  main policy  instrument  for  regional  redistribution.
A few  states  and  union  territories  were  excluded  on account  of data
gaps  or in  view  of their  extremely  small  share  in  national  population.
8.  Using  the  ICRISAT  panel  data for  three  villages  in  India's  semi-arid
tropics,  Ravallion  (1988)  finds  that  variability  over  time
(particularly  in  crop  and  labor  incomes)  is an important  contributing
factor  to  poverty  in the  long-run,  as  measured  by the  expected  value
of distributionally  sensitive  FGT  measures  (though  the  contribution  to
the  expected  value  of the  headcount  index  is small). Inter-sectoral
transfers  may thus  be  one  way to  alleviate  aggregate  poverty  by
reducing  income  variability  in the  rural  sector. Indeed,  this  is
arguably  an important  function  of  Maharashtra's  famous  "Employment
Guarantee  Scheme", which  finances  agricultural  work in lean  seasons
by taxes  on that  state's  urban  sector.- 32 -
9.  Some researchers  have  preferred  to  use  the interstate  price  deflator
estimated  by Bardhan  (1974). This  does,  however,  have some
disadvantages  for  our  purposes: Bardhan's  data  are  for  the  early
1960s  and  only  cover  rural  areas,  and  not  even  for  all  states. Rural
price  indices  for  1983  based  on  Bardhan's  data  do,  however,  turn  out
to  quite  strongly  correlated  with  those  based  on Bhattacharya  et al.
(1987)  when both  are  up-dated  by the  CPIAL  (r  =  0.83  across  the  15
comparable  states). The  interstate  variability  in real  mean
consumption  is  higher  using  the  deflator  based  on Bardhan's  study,
though  the  difference  is small  (a  population  weighted  CV of 4.2Z,
versus  3.72  when  based  on  Bhattacharya  et al).
10.  The  appropriateness  of  CPIAL  and  CPIIW  as  price  deflators  for  po'erty
analysis  has  been recently  questioned  by  Minhas  et  al. (1987,  1988)
who also  develop  alternative  price  indices  for  the  rural  and  urban
middle  three  deciles. However,  their  study  does  not  provide  state-
wise price  indices  for  rural  areas,  and  in  the  event,  using  CPIAL  and
CPIIW  seems  to  be the  best  that  one  can  do.
11.  The  Minhas  price  index  applied  to the  Dandekar-Rath  line  gives  a 1983
poverty  line  within  our  interval.
12.  The  poverty  estimates  for  rural  Jammu  and  Kashmir  (J&K)  are  lower  than
would  be expected  a  priori;  J&K is  a relatively  poor  state  by several
socio-economic  indicators,  such  as the  rates  of literacy  or infant
mortality. The  lower  poverty  estimates  are  largely  the  result  of a
'high'  value  of real  mean consumption;  29.2  percent  higher  than  mean
consumption  for  rural  India  at 1983  all-India  rural  prices. But,  even
in  terms  of current  prices,  mean  consumption  for  rural  J&K is  14.5
percent  higher  than  that  for  rural  India. The  rest  is,  of course,*
accounted  for  by the  difference  in  rural  J&K  and  rural  India. It
could  well  be that  the  inter-state  price  relative  constructed  by
Bhattacharya  et al. (1980),  which  we use in  this  study,  underestimates
prices  in rural  J&K  relative  to  other  regions. However,  as other
studies  of inter-state  price  variation  have  a  much small  regional
coverage,  we are  unable  to further  address  this  issue.
13.  These  regressions  should  be interpreted  as simplified  representations
of the  underlying  statistical  relationship  between  these  variables;
all  three  variables  (poverty  measure,  mean,  and  Gini)  are  of course
derived  from  the  same  distribution.  A dummy  variable  for  urban  areas
was also  tested  but  proved  highly  insignificant.  Note  that  the  logit
transform  avoids  the  truncation  which  arises  in  using  P0 as the
dependent  variable  (being  bounded  in  the  0, 1 interval). This
specification  comfortably  passed  a  Ramsey  RESET  test  on functional
form. Details  are  available  from  the  authors.- 33  -
REFERENCES
Arun,  T.K.  1989.  "Poverty  Ratio  as a Devolution  Criterion.  A Note."
Economic  and  Political  Weekly  24:319-321
Bardhan,  Pranab  K. 1974.  "On  the  Incidence  of Poverty  in  Rural  India  in
the  Sixties.' In P.K.  Bardhan  and  T.N.  Srinivasan  (eds.)  Poverty  and
Income  Distribution  in India,  Statistica'l  Publishing  Society,
Calcutta.
Besley,  T.,  and  Ravi  Kanbur. 1989.  "Principles  of Targeting",  DERC
Working  Paper,  University  of Warwick.
Bhattacharya,  N.,  G.S.  Chatterjee,  and  Padmaja  Pal.  1987.  "Variations  in
Level  of Living  Across  Regions  and  Social  Groups  in  Rural  India,
1963/64  and  1973/74." In T.  N. Sriaivasan  and  P.  Bardhan  (eds.)  Rural
Poverty  in South  Asia,  Columbia  University  Press,  New  York.
Bhattacharya,  N.,  P.D.  Joshi,  and  A. B. Roychoudhury.  1980. Regional  Price
Indices  Based  on  NSS  28th  Round  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  Data,
Sarvekshana,  3:107-121.
Dev,  S.M.  1988.  "Regional  Disparities  in  Agricultural  Labor  Productivity
and  Rural  Poverty  in India." Indian  Economic  Review  23:  167-205.
Foster,  James  E.,  J.  Greer  and  Erik  Thorbecke.  1984.  "A  Class  of
Decomposable  Poverty  Measures."  Econometrica  52:  761-66.
Glewwe,  Paul,  1989.  "Targeting  Assistance  to the  Poor:  Efficient  Allocation
of Transfers  when  Household  Incomes  are  Unobservable,"  mimeo,  Welfare
and  Human  Resources  Division,  World  Bank.
Government  of India  (GOI)  1988.  First  Report  of the  Ninth  Finance
Commission,  Government  of India,  Delhi.
Jain,  L.R.,  K. Sundaram,  and  S.D.  Tendulkar.  1988.  "Dimensions  of Rural
Pouerty: An Inter-Regional  Profile."  Economic  and  Political  Weekly
13:  2395-2408.
Kakwani,  Nanak.  1989.  "Poverty  and  Economic  Growth  with  Application  to  Cote
d'Ivoire,"  mimeo,  Welfare  and  Human  Resources  Division,  World  Bank.
Kanbur,  S.M.  Ravi.  1987.  "Measurement  and  Alleviation  of Poverty."  IMF
Staff  Papers  34:  60-85
Lipton,  M. 1977, Why  Poor  People  Stay  Poor,  Temple  Smith,  London.
Minhas,  B. S. et al.  1987.  "On  the  Choice  of Appropriate  Consumer  Price
.ndices  and  Data  Sets  for  Estimating  the  Incidence  of Poverty  in
India,"  Indian  Economic  Review,  12:  19-49.
Minhas,  B. S. et al.  1988.  "Measurement  of General  Cost  of Living  for
Urban  India: All-India  and  Different  States,"  Sarvekshana,  12:  1-23.- 34 -
Mishra,  G. (ed.)  1985.  ReRional  Structure  of  Development  and  Growth  in
India. Ashish  Publishing  House,  Delhi.
National  Sample  Survey  Organization  (NSSO)  1986.  "A  Report  on the  Third
Quinquennial  Survey  on  Consumer  Expenditure,  NSS  38th  Round".
Sarvekshana  9: Sl-S102.
Prasad,  Pradhan  H. 1988.  "Roots  of  Uneven  Regional  Growth  in India."
Economic  and  Political  Weekly  23:  1689-1692.
Ravallion,  Martin,  1984.  "How  Much is  a Transfer  Payment  Worth  to  a Rural
Worker?" Oxford  Economic  Papers  36:478-489.
Ravallion,  Martin,  1988.  "Expected  Poverty  Under  Risk  Induced  Welfare
Variability".  The  Economic  Journal  98:  1171-1182.
Ravallion,  Martin,  1989a.  "Land-Contingent  Poverty  Alleviation  Schemes."
World  Development,  17:  1223-1233.
Ravallion,  Martin.  1989b.  "Poverty  Alleviation  Through  Regional  Targeting:
a  Case Study  for  Indonesia."  World  Bank  Conference  on  Agricultural
Policies  and  the  Theory  of Rural  Organization.
Ravallion,  Martin  and  Kalvin  Chao,  1989.  "Targeted  Policies  for  Poverty
Alleviation  Under  Imperfect  Information:  Algorithms  and  Applications."
Journal  of Policy  Modeling  11:213-224.
Ravallion,  Martin  and  Monika  Huppi.  1989.  "Poverty  and  Undernutrition  in
Indonesia  During  the  1980s." PPR  Working  Paper.  World  Bank.
Registrar  General  and  Census  Commissioner  of India  (RGCCI)  1982. Final
Population  Totals, Census of India 1981, Series - 1, India, Paper - 1
of 1982,  Controller  of  Publications,  Delhi.
Sen,  Amartya  K., 1976.  "Poverty:  an  Ordinal  Approach  to  Measurement."
Econometrica  48:437-446.
Sundaram,  K.,  and  Suresh  D. Tendulkar,  1988.  "Toward  an Explanation  of
Interregional  Variations  in  Poverty  and  Unemployment  in  Rural  India."
In T.N.  Srinivasan  and  P. B4rdhan  (eds.)  Rural  Poverty  in South  Asia,
Columbia  University  Press,  New  York.
Sundrum,  R.H. 1987.  Growth  and  Income  Distribution  in  India. Policy  and
Performance  since  Independence,  Sage  Publications,  New  Delhi.
Thorbecke,  Erik  and  David  Berrian,  1989.  "Budgetary  Rules  to  Minimize
Societal  Poverty",  mimeo,  Cornell  University.- 35  -
Table  1:  Su.omry  Data  on  Regional  Disparities  1983
State  Urban  Rural  Total
.....  .......  ...  ....  ......  ......  ..  ....  ....  ....  ....  ..  ....  .............
Pop.  Mean  Gini  Pop.  Mean  Gini  Pop.  Mean
share  share  share
.....  .......  -.  .......................  ...................................................  ............................  ..  ......................
Andhra  Pradesh  1.92  137.46  0.310  6.01  134.84  0.296  7.92  135.47
Assam  0.32  121.37  0.259  2.67  102.90  0.201  2.99  104.86
Bihar  1.35  107.29  0.304  9.01  87.59  0.260  10.36  90.16
Gujarat  1.61  116.62  0.271  3.47  108.85  0.259  5.08  111.32
Haryana  0.44  147.33  0.315  1.49  150.38  0.276  1.93  149.68
Himachal  Pradesh  0.05  191.22  0.355  0.58  131.59.  0.277  0.63  136.21
Jammu  and  Kashmir  0.19  113.73  0.247  0.70  145.77  0.230  0.90  138.86
Karnataka  1.65  129.99  0.339  3.88  107.82  0.304  5.53  114.44
Kerala  0.72  144.00  0.387  3.02  130.42  0.338  3.74  133.04
Madhya  Pradesh  1.64  118.40  0.298  6.11  117.17  0.297  7.75  117.43
Maharashtra  3.34  130.16  0.342  5.97  102.96  0.286  9.31  112.71
Manipur  0.07  103.63  0.176  0.15  112.51  0.187  0.22  F09.86
Meghalaya  0.04  172.05  0.269  0.16  110.05  0.299  0.20  121.73
Orissa  0.49  125.46  0.303  3.40  91.92  0.271  3.89  96.15
Punjab  0.71  145.63  0.335  1.78  170.13  0.289  2.49  163.14
Rajasthan  1.12  124.38  0.307  4.03  145.05  0.346  5.15  140.55
Tamil  Nadu  2.38  119.20  0.356  4.72  103.06  0.328  7.09  108.47
Tripura  0.03  140.13  0.331  0.27  119.16  0.256  0.31  121.49
Uttar  Pradesh  3.10  116.77  0.315  13.37  118.05  0.295  16.47  117.81
West  Bengal  2.16  126.12  0.338  5.91  89.22  0.289  8.07  99.12
All-India  23.32  125.12  76.68  112.86  100.00  115.72
Population-weighted
coefficient  of variation  8.23  17.35  14.32
.......  ............  ..  . ..  . . ........................................................
Note:  All  mean  vatues  are in  Rs  at 1983  att-lrdia  rurat  prices.- 36  -
Table  2: Poverty  in India  1983
(Poverty  line  n  Rs 76.65)
State  Urban  Rural  Total
.........................  ........................................  .........................  ............................  ............
P0  P1  P2  P0  P1  P2  P0  ,1  P2
..................................................................................................
Andhra  Pradesh  20.93  4.53  1.52  20.36  4.28  1.40  20.50  4.34  1.43
Assam  22.27  3.97  1.06  26.24  4.26  1.08  25.82  4.23  1.07
Bihar  38.27  9.86  3.46  49.43  13.13  4.80  47.98  12.71  4.62
Gujarat  26.76  4.81  1.27  30.49  5.89  1.68  29.31  5.55  1.55
Haryana  17.40  3.32  0.99  11.56  1.94  0.55  12.89  2.26  0.65
Himachjl  Pradesh  11.08  2.21  0.72  17.88  2.86  0.72  17.36  2._1  0.72
Jan=u  and  Kashmir  24.85  3.75  0.84  5.57  0.65  0.14  9.73  1.32  0.29
Karnataka  29.36  7.67  2.82  37.13  10.01  3.75  34.81  9.31  3.47
Kerala  27.87  6.80  2.42  27.87  6.03  1.91  27.87  6.18  2.01
Maadhya  Pradesh  30.22  6.25  1.82  30.50  6.95  2.26  30.44  6.81  2.17
Maharashtra  29.83  8.03  3.02  38.97  9.83  3.42  35.69  9.18  3.28
Manipur  17.18  4.15  2.58  17.48  2.56  0.59  17.39  3.04  1.19
Meghalaya  5.10  0.73  0.19  35.28  10.06  3.89  29.59  8.30  3.19
Orissa  26.31  5.60  1.74  45.06  12.35  4.80  42.69  11.50  4.41
Punjab  21.54  4.49  1.37  7.67  1.13  0.29  11.62  2.09  0.60
Rajasthan  27.05  6.17  2.09  23.23  5.33  1.79  24.06  5.51  1:86
Tamil  Nadu  36.11  9.80  3.81  43.08  12.50  5.04  40.74  11.59  4.63
Tripui-a  22.94  5.27  1.81  23.07  4.21  1.16  23.06  4.33  1.24
Uttar  Pradesh  32.95  7.90  2.70  29.51  6.61  2.14  30.15  6.85  2.25
West  Bengal  30.63  7.66  2.73  47.96  15.01  6.52  43.31  13.04  5.51
All-India  29.48  7.10  2.48  33.61  8.39  3.03  32.65  8.09  2.90
Population-weighted
coefficient  of
variation  17.15  25.75  32.97  32.76  45.56  56.30  28.80  40.40  49.78
. . ..........................  ......................................................................
Note:  Att  poverty  measures  are  expressed  as percentages.- 37  -
Table  3:  Poverty  in India  1983
(Poverty  Line  a  Rs 89.00)
........................................................................................................................................... 
oCatr  Urban  Rural  Total
......................  .........................  .........................  .........................................  ............
P0  P1  P2  P0  P1  P2  P0  P1  .J2
..................................................................................................
A.ndhra  Pracd2sh  30.61  7.49  2.68  30.32  7.20  2.52  30.44  7.27  2.56
Assam  34.29  7.34  2.24  42.44  8.44  2.43  41.58  8.32  2.41
Bihar  49.28  14.58  5.73  62.48  19.10  7.74  60.76  18.52  7.48
Gujarat  40.05  8.79  2.70  44.43  10.28  3.33  43.04  9.81  3.13
Haryana  26.93  5.93  1.92  20.14  3.86  1.15  21.69  4.33  1.32
Himachat  Pradesh  17.58  3.89  1.32  29.79  5.77  1.64  28.85  5.62  1.62
Jammu  and  Kashmir  39.78  7.73  2.10  14.00  1.87  0.42  19.56  3.14  0.78
Karnataka  38.61  11.33  4.55  47.88  14.53  5.96  45.11  13.57  5.54
Kerala  37.76  10.42  4.02  39.07  9.85  3.47  38.82  9.96  3.58
Madhya  Pradesh  42.06  10.41  3.50  41.71  11.01  4.00  41.78  10.88  3.90
Maharashtra  38.82  11.68  4.79  50.71  14.70  5.72  46.45  13.62  5.38
Manipur  31.79  6.91  3.32  30.56  5.53  1.47  30.93  5.94  2.02
Meghalaya  11.09  1.72  0.45  44.79  14.23  6.03  38.44  11.87  4.98
Orissa  37.29  9.24  3.21  57.7'  17.79  7.46  55.16  16.71  6.93
Punjab  30.96  7.51  2.57  14.72  2.51  0.67  19.35  3.94  1.21
Rajasthan  37.90  9.83  3.62  32.37  8.45  3.11  33.58  8.75  3.22
Tamil  Nadu  46.80  14.21  5.94  54.06  17.52  7.63  51.63  16.41  7.06
Tripura  32.39  8.38  3.11  35.33  7.68  2.39  35.01  7.76  2.47
Uttar  Pradesh  44.19  12.17  4.60  40.85  10.58  3.81  41.48  10.88  3.96
West  Bengal  40.82  11.56  4.51  59.34  20.39  9.42  54.37  18.02  8.11
All-India  40.03  10.94  4.17  45.07  12.70  4.97  43.90  12.29  4.79
Population-weighted
coefficient  of
variation  13.46  20.47  26.92  26.46  38.21  47.85  23.05  33.68  42.28
Note:Allpoverymeas.................  ....  are  .......  as.  ps.
Note:  Ali poverty  measures  are  expressed  as percentages.- 38 -
Table  4:  Contribution  of Regional  Disparities  in  Meams  to  Aggregate
Poverty  and  the  Effects  of  Reducing  Intra-Regional  Inequalities
Poverty  Poverty  Actual  Simulated Contribution  Simulated  Percent
measure  line  poverty  poverty  of  unequal  poverty  with  reduction
with equal  means  to  5Z reduction  in  poverty
(Pa)  (z)  (P)  means  (P*)  poverty  in  Git,is  (1-P  */P)xlO0
(l-P*/P)xlOO  (P  **)
Headcount  76.65  32.65  30.91  5.33  30.85  5.51
index (a=0)  89.00  43.90  42.26  3.74  42.73  2.67
Povcrty  76.65  8.09  7.16  11.12  7.00  13.47
gap (a=l)  89.00  12.29  11.28  8.22  11.14  9.36
Preferred  76.65  2.90  2.90  0.07  2.31  20.20
measure(a=2)  89.00  4.79  4.79  0.01  4.06  15.20- 39 _
Table 5:  Effects of Regional Redistribution  on Aggregate Poverty
Poverty  Redistribution across all  Redistribution from urban to
measure  region/sectors  rural sectors
Rd)  Decreases  Increases  Decreases  Increases
poverty  poverty  poverty  poverty
Additively absorbed redistribution
z - 76.65
Headcount index  (PO)  664(85)  116(15)  18  2
Poverty gap  (P 1)  619(79)  161(21)  18  2
Preferred measure (P 2)  576(74)  204(26)  17  3
z =  89.00
Headcount index  (PO)  594(76)  186(24)  18  2
Poverty gap  (P 1)  658(84)  122(16)  18  2
Preferred measure (P 2)  600(77)  180(23)  17  3
Multiplicatively absorbed redistribution
z =  76.6'.
Headcount index  (PO)  725(93)  55(7)  19  1
Poverty gap  (P 1)  675(87)  105(13)  17  3
Preferred measure (P 2)  629(81)  151(19)  18  2
z = 89.00
Headcount index  (PO)  690(88)  90(12)  18  2
Poverty gap  (P 1)  727(93)  53(7)  19  1
Preferred measure (P 2)  659(84)  121(16)  18  2
Additively or multiplicatively absorbed redistribution
z =  76.65
Headcount index  (PO)  664(85)  116(15)  13  2
Poverty gap  (P 1)  617(79)  163(21)  17  3
Preferred measure (P 2)  571(73)  209(27)  16  4
z =  89.00
Headcount index  (PO)  594(76)  186(24)  18  2
Poverty gap  (P 1)  656(84)  124(16)  18  2
Preferred measure (P 2)  598(77)  182(23)  16  4,
Note:  The table gives the number of pairs between which small
redistributions from the higher mean to the lower  mean regions  will
decrease aggregate poverty, and the number for which poverty
increases.  Corresponding percentages are given in parentheses.- 40  -
Table 6s  Poverty Minimizing Regional Redistributions
Poverty Line
z =  76.65  z  89.00
State  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
Andhra Pradesh  -9.01  -9.86  -10.42  -11.19
Assam  -9.77  -7.71  -9.70  -6.04
Bihar  5.25  10.12  5.70  11.87
Gujarat  -6.57  -3.59  -5.78  -2.52
Haryana  -13.82  -21.83  -15.32  -23.68
Himachal Pradesh  -23.16  -14.14  -27.21  -14.17
Jammu and Kashmir  -9.20  -30.61  -7.77  -31.08
Karnataka  0.68  5.77  -0.57  5.77
Kerala  -1.65  -3.58  -2.67  -3.78
Madhya Pradesh  -2.83  -1.13  -2.42  -1.20
Maharashtra  1.61  5.90  0.24  5.78
Manipur  -10.73  -14.74  -10.52  -14.09
Meghlaya  -35.13  6.18  -37.79  5.51
Orissa  -4.87  9.54  -5.26  10.52
Punjab  -8.97  -29.39  -10.40  -32.05
Rajasthan  -3.34  -6.25  -3.94  -7.91
Tamil Nadu  5.45  10.24  5.24  10.69
Tripura  -6.46  -8.92  -8.05  -8.77
Uttar Pradesh  1.15  -2.02  1.20  -2.12
West Bengal  0.62  14.34  -0.04  14.92
Actual poverty  2.90  4.79
Minimum poverty  2.48  4.29
Equivalent gain (Rp/mn)  1.99  1.81
Note:  The table gives the gain or loss to each region  which minimizes
aggregate poverty such that population  weighted aggregate gains
match losses.  All monetary units are Rs per capita per  month at
1983 all-India rural prices.  The poverty measure is P2.- 41 -
Figure 1: Effects on aggregate  poverty of urban-rural redIstrIbution
(Poverty  line less then mode)
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Figure 2:  Effects  on aggregate  poverty  of  urban-rural  redistribution
(Poverty  line greater  than mode)
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